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21I n t r o d u c t i o n
Welfare programme participation (or, in British parlance, the take-up of
means-tested beneﬁts) has been the subject of much applied research. Stud-
ies by Altmann (1981), Mott (1983), Fry and Stark (1987, 1993), Blundell
et. al. (1988), Duclos (1995), Bollinger and David (1997) and Keane and
Mott (1998) are examples of the development of this literature. Means-
testing is an obvious way of focusing welfare spending on those most in need
whilst controlling the burden on public ﬁnances. The drawback of means-
testing is that people who are entitled to receive welfare beneﬁtm a yn o t
come forward to claim it. There is evidence that this is an important feature
of many welfare programmes in practice (see Kim and Mergoupis (1997) on
AFDC and Food Stamps in the USA, Riphahn (2001) on the Social Assis-
tance Programme in Germany and DWP (2001) on a range of programmes
in the UK). Possible reasons include the social stigma that may be asso-
ciated with welfare receipt and the egort or unpleasantness entailed in the
claim process (Mott, 1983; Cowell, 1986). Other possible components of
claim costs include the costs of information gathering and processing1 and
the implicit risk premium associated with the unpredictability of the claim
outcome (see, for example, Halpern and Hausman, 1986). There are few spe-
ciﬁc estimates of the magnitude of claim costs in the literature, despite the
interest in this issue and ﬁndings have been reported in various forms. For
example, Duclos (1995) reports expected Supplementary Beneﬁt claim costs
of around $3-4 per week for single pensioners and ﬁg u r e sa sh i g ha s$30 per
week for some other groups. Mott (1983) quotes an elasticity of AFDC
participation with respect to entitlement of roughly 0.6, while Blundell, Fry
and Walker (1988) report that a 50% increase in Housing Beneﬁt entitlement
for the average pensioner household generates a 7 percentage point increase
in take-up (an elasticity of roughly 0.2). There is no simple principle estab-
lished in the literature for translating results on the participation-entitlement
elasticity into the implied level of underlying claim costs. One of our aims
1Economic models of take-up are often criticised by non-economists as assuming im-
plausible degrees of rationality and knowledge. This ignores the fact that it may be
ecient to remain in ignorance of the details of welfare programmes if the costs of discov-
ering and understanding their rules is very large and the potential beneﬁts are moderate.
It is hard to believe that, if welfare payments were raised to arbitrarily large amounts, a
large number of the uninformed would not take some action to become better informed.
3here is to develop a simple way of doing this.
In this paper, we estimate the cash-equivalent values of the tangible and
intangible claim costs faced by digerent individuals. If the process of wel-
fare participation gives rise to some form of disutility, then it is possible to
construct an equivalent weekly cash amount which should be deducted from
the observed net income of beneﬁt claimants to give a true income-metric
welfare measure. However, in making this income adjustment, we have to
take account of the fact that there is self-selection into participation, so that
claimants will tend to be those who experience lower than average levels of
stigma and other claim costs and non-claimants tend to be those with high
levels of claim cost. We have found no published empirical work that takes
account of this self-selection in calculating individual-speciﬁc estimates of the
claim costs incurred by claimants and non-claimants, despite the fact that
take-up models are models of self-selection, nor has there been any com-
parison of alternative ways of making these individual-speciﬁc estimates. A
further innovation of the paper is to assess the potential impact of implicit
claim costs on the measurement of poverty.
Our application is to British pensioners at least 5 years beyond the o-
cial retirement age. Apart from the inherent interest in older pensioners as
a relatively low-income group, this has the advantage that labour supply is
virtually zero, so that labour market complications can be avoided. British
pensioners rely heavily on means-tested income from the state, despite the
fact that the state pension itself is not means-tested and private pension
coverage is high by international standards. Almost 40% of British pension-
ers receive at least one of three means-tested beneﬁts available to pensioners
(Department of Social Security, 2000). The scope of means-tested pensioner
beneﬁts will be extended from October 2003 with the introduction of a new
means-tested beneﬁt, Pension Credit, to which around 50% of pensioners are
expected to be entitled (Department for Work and Pensions (2002a)). De-
spite the high coverage of means-tested pensioner beneﬁts, they are thought
to suger from a signiﬁcant degree of non take-up. This is particularly so for
Income Support (IS) which provides general income maintenance. Ocial
estimates are that in the ﬁnancial year 1999/2000 about 30% of pensioners
who appeared to be entitled to IS did not receive it (Department for Work
and Pensions, 2001).
42 The state pension-beneﬁt system in Britain
The state pays three main types of beneﬁts to British pensioners: the ﬂat-rate
basic state pension, an earnings-related state pension and means-tested ben-
eﬁts. There are also disability-related beneﬁts which are not means-tested.
Most pensioners are entitled to the basic state pension earned through paying
social security contributions during their working lives, but not all qualify for
the full rate of pension. The state earnings related pension scheme (SERPS)
was introduced in 1978. Entitlements to SERPS depend on contributions
and past earnings. Pensioners retiring in 1998/9 were the ﬁrst to retire with
full SERPS rights. It is possible to opt out of SERPS and contribute to a pri-
vate pension instead. Latest ﬁgures show that the average total state pension
payment (basic pension, SERPS and other minor components) in September
2001 was marginally above the full basic state pension (Department for Work
and Pensions, 2002)’ but below the means-tested beneﬁtl e v e l .
2.1 Means-tested beneﬁtr u l e s
There are three main means-tested beneﬁts for pensioners: Income Support
(IS) providing general income maintenance; Housing Beneﬁt( H B ) ,g i v i n g
help with rent; and Council Tax Beneﬁt (CTB) which reduces recipients’
liability for local housing-related tax. The rules for calculation of entitlement
to HB and CTB mean that pensioners entitled to IS will also be entitled to
maximum HB, if they pay rent and CTB if they are liable for Council Tax.
People not entitled to IS may be entitled to lower amounts of HB and CTB.
Entitlement to each of the three beneﬁts can be calculated independently. In
this paper our concern is with IS.
IS is assessed and paid to pensioner units — single pensioners or pensioner
couples. Entitlement to IS is zero if the pensioner unit’s ﬁnancial holdings
are above an upper threshold ($8,000 during our sample period). Otherwise
it is the digerence between a guaranteed minimum (depending on age, dis-
ability and whether single or living with a partner) and assessable income
(depending on the pensioner unit’s income and capital). For pensioners, the
relevant disability-related addition to the guaranteed minimum is the Severe
Disability Premium (SDP). Eligibility for the SDP is determined partly by
receipt of Attendance Allowance (AA) or the care component of Disability
Living Allowance (DLA), which are mutually exclusive, non means-tested
5disability-related beneﬁts. Sources as well as levels of income therefore agect
both assessable income and prescribed amounts. Certain kinds of income,
such as AA and DLA, are excluded in part or in full from assessable income.
Actual income from capital is also excluded. Instead a notional income from
capital between a lower threshold ($3,000 during our sample period) and the
upper threshold is assumed at the rate of $1aw e e kf o re a c h$250 or part
of $250 of capital between the two limits. The main beneﬁt rates prevailing
over the sample period are set out in Appendix Table A1.
2.2 The claims process
To receive Income Support, pensioners must submit a claim to the Depart-
ment for Work and Pensions (DWP). In the period we are concerned with,
this entailed completing and taking a 40-page form to their local social se-
curity oce. Details of all sources of income, savings and relevant personal
characteristics have to be provided. Attached to the IS form are supple-
mentary forms covering HB and CTB. Consequently, applications for IS are
almost always accompanied by applications for CTB and (for renters) HB,
and IS is almost never received in isolation.2
If found to be entitled to IS, payment is often made with the state pen-
sion so the pensioner does not need to attend a social security oce every
week. In principle changes in circumstances which might agect entitlement
are supposed to be reported immediately so that payment can be adjusted
accordingly. In practice re-assessments are less frequent. The process of
claiming the new Pension Credit, which will subsume IS in 2003, is intended
to be less stigmatising, with less frequent re-assessments and more of the
onus for initiating claims placed on DWP. However in the late 1990s, the
period considered here, few pensioners would have expected the experience
of claiming IS to be enjoyable or hassle-free.
2In our sample period only around 0.56% of IS recipients received neither HB nor CTB.
Only 0.89% of those receiving IS+HB did not also receive CTB; among renters, only 1.36%
of those receiving IS+CTB did not also receive HB.
63 Take-up: evidence from the 1997-2000 Fam-
ily Resources Survey
3.1 The Family Resources Survey
The Family Resources Survey (FRS) is a continuous cross-sectional survey of
British households carried out on behalf of the DWP. During April 1997 to
March 2000, 71,378 households containing 169,053 individuals participated
in the survey. All adult respondents were asked whether they were receiving
each of a comprehensive set of social security beneﬁts and if so, the amount
they last received. Details of private sources of income, capital holdings,
personal and other characteristics relevant to calculating entitlement to IS
are also recorded. In principle, therefore, we can assess each FRS pensioner
unit’s entitlement to IS, establish whether they are receiving IS and develop
a model of take-up behaviour. In practice the data are likely to be subject
to measurement error.
The pensioner rates of Income Support apply to single people aged 60
years or more or couples where either partner is aged at least 60. In the
combined 1997-2000 FRS there were 26,229 such pensioner units. To simplify
t h ea n a l y s i sw er e s t r i c t e dt h es a m p l et oaﬁnal selection of 12,801 pensioner
units in the following way:
(1) Only those at least ﬁve years above state pension age (i.e. men aged
7 0 +a n dw o m e na g e d6 5 + )w e r ei n c l u d e da n dt h o s ew i t he m p l o y m e n to r
self-employment were excluded. Restricting the sample to those at least ﬁve
years above state pension age excluded 10,339 pensioner units. Excluding
those with income from employment or self-employment reduced the sample
by a further 525.
(2) Only households containing a single pensioner aged at least 65 (female)
or 70 (male) or a couple where both partners were ﬁve or more years above
state pension age were included. The presence of other household mem-
bers considerably complicates the calculation of IS entitlement and increases
the scope for measurement error. This restriction excluded another 2,140
pensioner units. Of these, 15 contained children but no other adults; the
remainder contained other adults.
(3) Households still re-paying a mortgage were excluded. Such payments
agect the calculation of IS entitlement, are a potential source of measurement
7error but exist for only a small minority of the age group of interest; 413 cases
were excluded for this reason.
(4) Eleven cases in receipt of allowances from an absent spouse were also
excluded.
3.2 Data cleaning
Any errors in recorded income (including state beneﬁts) or capital will lead to
errors in assessed entitlement. If income and capital are used as explanatory
variables in an econometric model of take-up behaviour, such measurement
errors have the potential to result in serious bias in model estimates with
corresponding implications for their use in policy analysis (Pudney 2001). To
minimise the potential bias from measurement error, we applied a process
of error detection and correction to the data before using them to model
take-up behaviour.
The ﬁrst step was to reverse data edits and imputations made by DWP,
agecting beneﬁt receipts, private pension income and capital holdings. This
was because we detected some inconsistencies in edits to beneﬁtd a t aa n d
because some of their procedures (e.g. substitution of sample means for
missing values) are not appropriate when attempting to calculate means-
tested beneﬁt entitlement. The next stage involved detecting inconsistencies
in beneﬁt data and reconciling them where possible. Potential errors in
recorded receipts of social security beneﬁts are generally easier to identify
than errors in other sources of income or in capital because speciﬁed beneﬁt
rates and eligibility rules allow consistency checks to be made. Missing values
for beneﬁt receipt were imputed where a correct value could be identiﬁed.
For example, some pensioners in the FRS are able to supply a breakdown
of their state pension payments which helps to disentangle digerent beneﬁts
received as one combined payment. In other cases it is clear that a payment
of IS is included in their pension payment and there is double counting if a
separate amount of IS is also recorded. Where it was not possible to correct
an inconsistency or to impute a missing value on any reliable basis, the value
was left missing. This was true for all missing values for private pension
and capital holdings where there is no reliable way to impute an individual-
speciﬁc value. Full details of this data cleaning process can be found in
Hancock and Barker (2002).
For this paper, we excluded observations where recorded beneﬁti sp o s i -
8tive, IS-assessable income exceeds the guaranteed minimum but no IS doc-
umentation was consulted by the survey respondent. A further assumption
was made to reduce the number of cases dropped due to missing values. In
cases with missing assessable income but with non-missing IS and capital, as-
sessable income was set to the amount consistent with the size of the recorded
IS and the appropriate IS guaranteed minimum.
Two digerent variants of the dataset are considered throughout the pa-
per for both the pre-cleaned and cleaned data. These samples diger in the
entitlement measure used and give an idea of the robustness of our results.
Sample 1, uses simulated IS entitlement based on assessable income, capital
and the guaranteed minimum. Sample 2 substitutes recorded IS, where avail-
able, for simulated entitlement provided it does not exceed the guaranteed
minimum for the beneﬁt unit and provided the respondent consulted IS doc-
umentation. In such cases and in cases where IS receipt is missing, simulated
IS entitlement is used instead. In addition, cases where recorded IS beneﬁto r
assessable income was higher than the relevant guaranteed income level and
cases where the guaranteed level was smaller than recorded IS beneﬁtp l u s
notional income from capital were excluded from sample 2. In general, we
regard the cleaned version of sample 2 as the most likely to give an accurate
picture of IS entitlement.3
3.3 Take-up rates
Table 1 shows estimated IS take-up rates for the two samples, before and
after cleaning the data. These rates are largely unagected by the choice
of sample and data cleaning. There is some variation by category of pen-
sioner, but the typical rate of non-participation is roughly one third, ranging
for digerent samples from 33.5% to 35.4%. Although not directly compa-
rable, these are close to the ocial estimate of 30% reported by DWP for
1999/2000. In all the samples considered here, both before and after clean-
ing the data, single females appear to have higher take-up rates than single
males and couples. Take-up rates are also higher in all the samples for pen-
sioners in the younger age groups. Pensioners who left full-time education
3We also tried an additional sample which substituted recorded IS, where available for
simulated entitlement provided it did not exceed the guaranteed minimum for the beneﬁt
unit. In such cases and in cases where IS receipt was missing simulated entitlement was
used instead. The results are very similar to sample 2 reported in this paper.
9after the age of fourteen have lower take-up rates. Take-up rates are higher
for pensioners with disabilities but the reverse is true for those in receipt of
disability beneﬁt. Take-up varies considerably with housing tenure, renters
having much higher rates than home owners. Pensioners living in Scotland
and Wales have relatively low take-up rates in all samples.
10Table 1 Percentage take-up rates by demographic groups
(1997/8-1999/00 FRS estimation sample; weighted sample frequencies)
Take-up rate (std. error)
Sample group original sample cleaned sample
1212
Single male 57.3
(2.4)
58.4
(2.4)
55.4
(2.7)
56.5
(2.6)
Single female 67.6
(1.0)
68.3
(1.0)
69.2
(1.1)
69.6
(1.1)
Couple 52.3
(3.0)
56.9
(2.8)
54.6
(3.2)
58.3
(3.0)
Head under 70 79.3
(2.4)
79.9
(2.3)
79.2
(2.5)
79.5
(2.5)
Head 70-79 66.2
(1.4)
67.6
(1.3)
67.5
(1.5)
68.5
(1.4)
Head 80-89 60.1
(1.4)
60.9
(1.4)
61.3
(1.5)
61.9
(1.5)
Head 90+ 61.4
(3.6)
61.8
(3.6)
59.7
(4.2)
60.6
(4.2)
Education < 14 72.3
(3.6)
73.0
(3.5)
69.5
(4.0)
70.1
(4.0)
Education equal to 14 65.8
(1.0)
67.0
(1.0)
67.2
(1.1)
68.1
(1.1)
Education > 14 58.2
(2.0)
58.7
(2.0)
59.2
(2.2)
59.3
(2.2)
Not receiving disability beneﬁt 65.3
(1.1)
66.5
(1.1)
66.1
(1.2)
66.9
(1.2)
Receiving disability beneﬁt 63.6
(1.4)
64.4
(1.4)
64.9
(1.7)
65.8
(1.6)
Not disabled 63.8
(1.0)
64.8
(1.0)
64.9
(1.1)
65.7
(1.1)
Either disabled 68.3
(2.0)
69.2
(1.9)
69.6
(2.2)
70.3
(2.2)
Owner occupier 48.6
(1.8)
50.4
(1.7)
49.9
(2.0)
51.5
(1.9)
Rent 71.6
(1.0)
72.4
(1.0)
72.3
(1.1)
72.9
(1.1)
Rent free 54.4
(4.9)
54.8
(4.9)
54.2
(5.5)
54.2
(5.5)
Scotland or Wales 60.3
(2.1)
61.7
(2.1)
61.2
(2.4)
62.2
(2.3)
Rest of Britain 65.6
(1.0)
66.5
(0.9)
66.6
(1.1)
67.4
(1.0)
Full sample 64.6
(0.9)
65.7
(0.9)
65.7
(1.0)
66.5
(0.9)
Sample size 2929 3019 2417 2475
11Let p be a given percentage of original pre-IS net income and let S (p)b e
the proportion of IS non-claimants who are entitled to an amount of IS in
excess of the proportion of their income. Figure 1 plots S (p). Even though
many pensioners who do not take up IS are entitled to small beneﬁts, over
half of the non-claimants could increase their income by at least 10% and
more than 25% of non-claimants could increase their income by at least 20%.
Thus non-participation in the IS programme has important consequences for
a large minority of potential recipients.
Figure 1 Distribution of IS non-claimants by size of unclaimed beneﬁt
as a proportion of original income
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124 The revealed preference approach
Our analysis is based on the idea that individuals will claim the beneﬁtt o
which they are entitled whenever they see it as being in their best inter-
ests, after allowing for all costs associated with beneﬁt claim and receipt.
These claim costs can be ﬁnancial (such as the cost of travel to the social
security oce), tangible but non-ﬁnancial (for example the time or physical
diculty involved), social (for example social stigma) or psychological (for
example feelings of inadequacy or shame induced by dependency). Formally,
the analysis is based on an assumption of full awareness of the beneﬁts y s t e m .
However, total lack of awareness of the existence of social security beneﬁts
is probably very rare indeed. We argue that awareness is itself partly a mat-
ter of choice, since information can be acquired with a certain expenditure
of egort. The egort required to become informed can then be treated as a
component of claim costs.
Note that our notion of claim costs is broad enough to encompass a
wide range of factors. Someone who sugers diculty in coping with the
process of claiming beneﬁt because of physical or mental impairment is seen
as sugering from high claim costs. Those with access to external assistance
from family, neighbours or other carers are likely to ﬁnd it easier to make a
claim than similar people with no such support. Thus claim costs depend on
personal characteristics and circumstances as well as factors like the design
of applications procedures. It is therefore very important to allow for wide
variations in claim costs across beneﬁt units.
4.1 The take-up model
Let the long-term welfare of the beneﬁt unit be represented by a utility
function U0(Y ;X,V), where Y is net income in the absence of means-tested
beneﬁt, X is a vector of observable characteristics and V represents unob-
servable characteristics which vary randomly across beneﬁt units. When
means-tested beneﬁts are claimed, there is a possible shift in welfare repre-
sented by a transformed utility function U1(Y + B;X,V), where B is the
additional beneﬁt income. The shift from U0 to U1 is induced by some form
of claim costs. Under the assumption of strict rationality, the condition for
13take-up to occur is:
U1(Y + B;X,V) >U 0(Y ;X,V)( 1 )
Since utility is monotonic and continuous in income, this can be rewritten:
B>U
31
1 (U0(Y ;X,V);X,V)  Y (2)
where the function U
31
1 (.;X,V)i sU1 inverted with respect to its ﬁrst argu-
ment. Note that, if the functions U0 and U1 are identical, U
31
1 (U0;X,V)Y
is equal to 0 and beneﬁt is claimed whenever the entitlement is strictly pos-
itive. When U
31
1 (U0;X,V)  Y is positive, it can be interpreted as a com-
pensating variation: the cash equivalent of any stigma or claim costs acting
as a disincentive to take-up.
Empirically, a better ﬁt is obtained by working with the logarithm of
beneﬁt entitlement. We thus approximate the log of the right-hand side of
(2) directly by a linear stochastic function Z + V ,w h e r eZ is a vector of
variables constructed from (Y,X), rather than using explicit speciﬁcations
for U0 and U1. Note that this approach can also be used in the case where
the outcome of a claim is uncertain. In that case expected utility can be
written:
EU = PU 1(Y + B;X,V)+( 1 P)U2(Y ;X,V)( 3 )
where P is the subjective probability of success and where success and failure
can both entail stigma or cost, through the forms U1, U2.I n t h i s c a s e ,( 2 )
becomes4:
B>U
31
1
Ã
U0(Y ;X,V)  (1  P)U2(Y ;X,V)
P
;X,V
!
 Y (4)
As an alternative to the approximation of (2) or (4) by Z + V ,w ec a n
follow Mott (1983) and use an explicit speciﬁcation of the preference shift
induced by stigma or claim costs. For example, in the certainty case, we
might assume:
U1(Y ;X,V)=U0(Y  e
Z+V;X,V)( 5 )
4Condition (4) is equivalent to the certainty case if U2 is assumed identical to U0:i n
other words, if stigma only arises from beneﬁt receipt rather than the claim process.
14Thus the claim cost is treated as a ﬁxed cash-equivalent amount varying
with observable individual characteristics (including original income) and
with unobservable individual-speciﬁc factors. In this case:
U
31
1 (U0(Y ;X,V);X,V)  Y = e
Z+V (6)
and the condition for take-up is:
lnB>Z + V (7)
The conditional take-up probability is then:
Pr(take-up|B,Z)=P r ( V< lnB  Z)
= F
Ã
lnB  Z
j
!
(8)
where j2 = var(V )a n dF(.) is the distribution function of the random
variable V/j. The probability (8) amounts to a standard binary response
model of discrete choice, using lnB and Z as explanatory variables. In such
a model, the coecients of lnB and Z are 1/j and /j respectively, so that
 can be estimated as minus their ratio. Given , an estimate of claim costs
C =e x p ( Z + V ) can be constructed for each individual beneﬁt recipient.
All that is required is a speciﬁc form for the function F.
4.2 Identiﬁcation
In general terms, the model is of the form:
Pr(take-up|Y,X)=G(B(Y,X),Y,X)( 9 )
where G is a function with range [0,1] and B(Y,X) represents the rules
of the IS programme. If all the variables in (Y,X) can appear indirectly
through B(Y,X) and also directly in their own right, then it is clear that
the model is nonparametrically unidentiﬁed despite the fact that B(.)i sa
known function.5 There are various restrictions that might be used to resolve
5For example, replace B by B+(1)B where  is an arbitrary function of Y,X.N o w
rewrite the model G(B,Z), where Z =[ ( 1)B(Y,X):Y : X]. This is observationally
equivalent to the original model. This identiﬁcation problem is characteristic of most
attempts to capture the incentive eects of tax and social security systems from cross-
section surveys.
15this identiﬁcation problem. We are usually content to make a smoothness
assumption about the direct egect on behaviour of personal characteristics
such as age, income and wealth. There are, however, a number of disconti-
nuities and kinks built into the IS rules: (i) discontinuities in the guaranteed
minimum with respect to age (at 75 and 80); (ii) several discontinuities in the
guaranteed minimum with respect to the amount of disability beneﬁt; and
(iii) a kink in the deﬁnition of notional income with respect to capital (at
$3000). A smoothness assumption on the direct impact of age, capital and
the disability beneﬁt element of income will theoretically suce to ensure
identiﬁcation, provided the minimum acceptable degree of smoothness can
be imposed appropriately. Exclusion restrictions can also be used to identify
the model. If one or more of the variables determining B can be excluded
ap r i o r ifrom the model, then the separate impacts of B and (Y,X)c a nb e
distinguished empirically. Our ﬁnal speciﬁcation embodies several such re-
strictions. Some of these are data-driven, but we have assumed ap r i o r ithat
ﬁnancial capital has a direct egect on take-up behaviour only through the
contribution of observed investment returns to net income. The amount of
capital itself is excluded.
4.3 Implicit claim costs
Our aim is to construct estimates of implicit claim costs: the compensat-
ing variation required to ogset stigma and other barriers to participation.
Once F(.), j and  are known, estimates of individual claim costs can be
constructed in various ways. It is not appropriate to use the unconditional
mean Zi as most other researchers have done, since this does not make
use of the information we have about the actual take-up decision of unit i.
Instead we should condition the prediction of claim costs for claimants on
the take-up event Z+V< lnB. For non-claimants costs can be estimated
by conditioning on the event Z + V  lnB.
A natural approach is to use a conditional expectation. For an IS recipi-
ent:
b C1 = E(exp(Z + V )|V< lnB  Z)
= e
Z
5
7
lnB3Z Z
3"
e
VdF(V )
6
8
5
7
lnB3Z Z
3"
dF(V )
6
8
31
(10)
16In the special probit case where F is the standard normal distribution func-
tion, this yields the following expression (Aitchison and Brown 1957, page
87):
b C1 =e x p
Ã
Z+
2
2
!
x
Ã
lnB  Z  
2

!,
x
Ã
lnB  Z

!
(11)
where x(.) is the standard normal distribution function. For a non-claimant:
b C1 = E(exp(Z + V )|V  lnB  Z)
=e x p
Ã
Z+
2
2
!"
1  x
Ã
lnB  Z  
2

!# ,"
1  x
Ã
lnB  Z

!#
(12)
An alternative is to use a conditional median estimate, b C2,w h i c hs a t -
isﬁes Pr
³
Z + V< ln b C2 |V< lnB  Z
´
=0 .5. Using Bayes’ rule for
claimants:
F
Ã
ln b C2  Z
j
!,
F
Ã
lnB  Z
j
!
=0 .5( 1 3 )
and thus:
b C2 =e x p
(
j
"
Z(/j)+F
31
Ã
1
2
F
Ã
lnB  Z
j
!!#)
(14)
For non-claimants, the condition Pr(lnB<Z+V< ln b C2 |Z + V> lnB)=
0.5g i v e s :
b C2 =e x p
(
j
"
Z(/j)+F
31
Ã
1
2
"
1+F
Ã
lnB  Z
j
!#!#)
(15)
Note that b C1 and b C2 always lie below the unconditional mean and median
of exp(Z + V ) for participants and above for non-participants. Claimants
will, on average, tend to be those who suger lower than average levels
of stigma or claim costs and conversely for non-claimants. The relation-
ship between implicit claim costs and the coecient of lnB is important.
As j $4 , the impact of entitlement on take-up vanishes. If we adjust
17 so as to keep the take-up probability constant at some value P,t h e n
limj<" Z(/j)=F31(P). Consider the median (14). Since F31(1
2P) 
F31(P) < 0, limj<" b C2 = 0. This occurs because the leftward shift in the
median induced by the truncation condition C<Bis greater, the larger is j.
Conversely, limj<" b C2 =+ 4 for non-claimants: as we increase j, Z must
increase towards lnB in order to keep the take-up probability constant. Thus
the entitlement coecient is critical in this type of model. A small value will
imply modest implicit claim costs for those who do take-up the beneﬁt, but
very much larger costs for those who do not. A large coecient implies large
claim costs for claimants and a weaker distinction between claimants and
non-claimants.
5E s t i m a t e s
5.1 The binary take-up model
We apply two digerent estimators of the binary take-up model. One is the
familiar probit model, based on the assumption that the distribution function
F(.) is standard normal. The second is the semi-parametric estimator of
Klein and Spady (1993) which, in its simplest form, maximises the following
quasi-log-likelihood:
max
 lnL()=
n X
i=1
n
yi ln
³
b F(lnBi  Zi)
´
+( 1 yi)ln
³
1  b F(lnBi  Zi)
´o
(16)
where b F(.) is a nonparametric kernel estimate of the regression function of
yi on lnBi  Zi.6 We use the Gaussian kernel:
b F(lnBi  Zi)=
P
j6=i (h31[(lnBi  Zi)  (lnBj  Zj)])yj
P
j6=i (h31[(lnBi  Zi)  (lnBj  Zj)]) (17)
where (.) is the standard normal density function. We experimented with
av a r i e t yo fﬁxed and adaptive bandwidths (the latter using the Breiman et.
6Note that b F is not normalised to have zero mean and unit variance. Scale and location
are normalised by ﬁxing the coecient of b at unity and excluding the intercept term from
the linear form Z.T h i sd o e sn o ta ect the construction of implicit cost estimates.
18al. (1977) method). The results were remarkably insensitive to the particular
choice used. The results reported below are based on a ﬁxed bandwidth h
equal to 0.6.
Tables 2, and 3 give estimates of the stigma/claim cost coecients .
The variables appearing in the model are deﬁned and summarised in Appen-
dix Table A2. For the probit model the estimates are calculated as minus the
coecients of the relevant variables divided by the coecient of lnBi.T h e
estimates are the outcome of an extensive process of speciﬁcation search. The
chosen form is superior to other models with alternative functional forms for
income and entitlement, fuller location egects (at Standard Region level), de-
mographic structure and a more general speciﬁcation involving the ages and
education levels of both members for 2-person households. To guard against
pre-test bias, we have used throughout a conservative criterion, retaining ex-
planatory variables with asymptotic t-ratios in excess of 1.0. Besides log en-
titlement, the main factors generating high claim costs emerge as income per
head, education, status as a recipient of disability beneﬁt, owner-occupation
and location.
The estimated egect of income is always signiﬁcant (at the 5% level with
a 1-tailed test) but varies considerably over the three samples. For the probit
model estimated on the pre-cleaned sample 1 data, the coecient implies a
large 12% increase in expected claim costs for each additional $1o fo r i g i n a l
income. This falls to under 2% when the (presumably more accurate) cleaned
data from sample 2 is used. For the Klein-Spady estimates the range is even
greater: a 16% impact on the pre-cleaned sample 1 data but under 2% for
the cleaned sample 2 data.
Education has a very large egect. Having schooling past age 14 is esti-
mated to almost triple expected claim costs (on the basis of models estimated
from the cleaned sample 2 data). Although better-educated people may have
greater capacity to negotiate the intricacies of the beneﬁt system, on this ev-
idence they must also typically be more vulnerable to stigma or tend to be
in circumstances entailing greater costs of claiming.
The two disability variables reﬂect the household’s status as a recipient
of a (medically assessed but non-means-tested) disability beneﬁta n do ra s
one containing a registered disabled person. These have respectively positive
and negative impacts on expected claim costs, the former larger and more
signiﬁcant in our preferred sample 2. Note that registering as a disabled
person is voluntary and has no direct implications for beneﬁt entitlement,
19but may bring other beneﬁts such as subsidised transport, unrestricted car
parking, etc. Unfortunately, we cannot observe the true physical state of
the household members, so these two variables summarise a combination
of factors. One might interpret the coecient of the former variable as an
indicator of physical impairment which increases the physical diculty of
coping with the IS claims process and thus increases implicit claim costs
(roughly threefold for our preferred cleaned sample 2). The latter variable
might be interpreted as an indicator of low vulnerability to stigma: those
who are willing to seek formal recognition of disability may also tend to be
more willing to accept an IS-dependent status and thus have lower expected
claim costs (by around 55%). In the absence of direct information on physical
capacity, such interpretations are necessarily speculative.
Housing tenure is closely linked to social status as well as wealth. Being a
home-owner greatly increases the barriers to IS take-up, increasing estimated
mean claim costs six-fold.7
There has been some attention paid by sociologists to neighbourhood in-
ﬂuences on welfare participation behaviour, with the conclusion that high
local rates of poverty, welfare dependency and density of population lead to
higher rates of take-up, because of the lesser impact of social stigma and bet-
ter local information and support, reducing claim costs (Hirschl and Rank,
1999). We are only able to match survey respondents to large regions rather
than neighbourhoods and there are, consequently, no very strong locational
egects detectable. However, residence in Wales or Scotland rather than Eng-
land is estimated to raise claim costs and thus reduce take-up: a result that
runs counter to what one might expect, since Wales and Scotland have higher
average rates of poverty than England. They also have proportionately larger
rural areas, so the lower population density than in England may account
for this ﬁnding. In any case, the egect is relatively modest.
In general, the probit and the Klein-Spady estimates have similar qual-
itative implications in all the samples considered here. However there is an
7Since renters who are entitled to IS are also entitled to both HB and CTB and owners
entitled to IS are also entitled to CTB we also estimated two additional models using the
cleaned dataset. The ﬁrst model used total entitlement to all beneﬁts as the entitlement
amount while in the second, total entitlement was used only for renters and IS entitlement
for owner-occupiers. Although the coecient of owner-occupiers became smaller in both
samples, the model with entitlement to IS ﬁtted better.
20important digerence for age, which plays a signiﬁcant role in the probit model
for all samples, with and without data cleaning. Claim costs are estimated
to increase with age, although at a decreasing rate. If accepted, this result
would be hard to rationalise. It seems unlikely that people who claim beneﬁt
when younger would cease to do so when they reach a critical age. Adjust-
ment models based on random durations of periods of need (see Anderson
and Meyer, 1997) seem inappropriate here and imply rising take-up rates.
The most plausible interpretation would be that the age variable reﬂects a
cohort egect implying a gradual upward drift in take-up rates over time.
No clear trends in IS take-up among pensioners have been observed at the
macro level (DWP 2001 and earlier issues). However, once the more ﬂexible
semiparametric approach is used, age becomes insigniﬁcant for all samples.
21Table 2 Parametric and semi-parametric coecient estimates
(Scaled coecients b ;s a m p l e1 )
Pre-cleaning1 Cleaned2
Probit Klein-Spady Probit Klein-Spady
Variable b 
|t|
b 
|t|
b 
|t|
b 
|t|
Single male household -1.687 -2.627 -0.889 -1.947
(1.917) (1.872) (0.944) (1.358)
Single female household -3.294 -4.074 -3.582 -4.009
(3.173) (2.539) (2.780) (2.206)
Age/10 16.494 -2.084 13.894 -1.948
(2.858) (0.324) (2.061) (0.275)
(Age/10)2 -0.980 0.180 -0.811 0.184
(2.731) (0.443) (1.928) (0.409)
Income per person 0.115 0.146 0.104 0.121
(3.503) (2.670) (2.806) (2.201)
Head educated past 14 1.856 1.840 2.207 1.923
(3.380) (2.435) (3.101) (2.212)
Disability beneﬁt 1.226 0.777 0.440 0.359
(3.021) (1.180) (0.728) (0.445)
Registered disabled -1.171 -1.239 -1.539 -1.248
(2.206) (1.559) (2.215) (1.434)
Owner occupier 3.635 3.653 3.954 3.409
(4.549) (3.426) (3.920) (2.922)
Rent free 2.602 2.392 2.738 2.524
(2.562) (1.804) (2.191) (1.611)
Wales/Scotland 0.872 0.887 1.136 1.032
(1.891) (1.350) (1.943) (1.398)
1 n = 2929. 2 n = 2417.
22Table 3 Parametric and semi-parametric coecient estimates
(Scaled coecients b ;s a m p l e2 )
Pre-cleaning1 Cleaned2
Probit Klein-Spady Probit Klein-Spady
Variable b 
|t|
b 
|t|
b 
|t|
b 
|t|
Single male household 0.071 -0.061 0.499 0.379
(0.179) (0.122) (1.341) (0.793)
Single female household -0.859 -0.975 -0.669 -0.775
(2.375) (2.222) (1.972) (1.769)
Age/10 10.054 -0.718 7.899 -0.484
(3.387) (0.298) (2.716) (0.142)
(Age/10)2 -0.585 0.088 -0.453 0.073
(3.152) (0.577) (2.477) (0.340)
Income per person 0.030 0.033 0.015 0.016
(3.802) (3.379) (2.181) (1.748)
Head educated past 14 1.177 1.109 1.087 1.027
(4.473) (3.438) (4.293) (3.208)
Disability beneﬁt 1.539 1.321 1.286 1.177
(6.958) (4.425) (5.546) (3.729)
Registered disabled -0.636 -0.702 -0.595 -0.603
(2.289) (1.794) (2.123) (1.576)
Owner occupier 2.123 2.087 1.897 1.876
(7.157) (6.127) (7.037) (5.573)
Rent free 1.432 1.267 1.247 1.265
(2.742) (2.003) (2.436) (1.947)
Wales/Scotland 0.559 0.573 0.634 0.628
(2.233) (1.733) (2.541) (1.962)
1 n =3019 . 2 n = 2475.
Figure 2 shows the distribution functions ˆ F (.) for the probit and the
Klein-Spady models in sample 2 using the cleaned data. To make these
comparable, the probit probability, x(.), is plotted against the standardised
Klein-Spady estimate. The most striking digerence between the two dis-
23tributions is the fatter upper tail of the Klein-Spady estimate and a local
concentration at around 1 standard deviations in the lower tail.
Figure 2 Estimated distribution functions for the probit and Klein-
Spady models.
5.2 Estimates of the implicit stigma/claim costs
5.2.1 Claim costs incurred by claimants
Table 4 shows some summary measures of the estimated claim costs for
the subsample of pensioners receiving Income Support. These estimates are
constructed using expressions (10) and (14), which give quite digerent results
because of the skewness in the lognormal distribution for C. The Klein-Spady
estimates give substantially higher estimated claim costs than the probit
model, regardless of the method used to construct the implicit costs. The
results are rather sensitive to the choice of sample, with larger costs estimated
for samples 2, where recorded rather than simulated beneﬁt receipt is used
when possible. Data cleaning makes relatively little digerence to the results.
Even using the preferred semi-parametric estimates the average estimated
claim cost for IS recipients is small, averaging around $3.59 per week in the
preferred sample 2.
24Figure 3 shows the empirical distribution of these estimated claim costs
for the subset of pensioners within sample 2 (cleaned data) who are observed
to be in receipt of IS. The Klein-Spady estimates imply greater dispersion,
especially when the conditional mean method is used to construct the implicit
costs.
25Table 4 Summary measures of estimated stigma/claim costs
for Income Support recipients ($ per week)
Pre-cleaning
Mean Median Std. dev.
Probit: Sample 11 1.64 1.01 1.53
conditional mean Sample 22 2.89 1.75 2.65
method ( b C1)
Probit: Sample 11 0.08 0.02 0.15
conditional median Sample 22 0.67 0.35 0.86
method ( b C2)
Klein-Spady: Sample 11 4.02 2.09 5.37
conditional mean Sample 22 4.05 2.58 4.12
method ( b C1)
Klein-Spady: Sample 11 2.59 0.78 4.92
conditional median Sample 22 2.22 1.07 3.12
method ( b C2)
1n = 1893; 2n = 1983;
Cleaned data
Mean Median Std. dev.
Probit: Sample 14 1.25 0.82 1.18
conditional mean Sample 25 2.93 1.80 2.72
method ( b C1)
Probit: Sample 14 0.04 0.01 0.07
conditional median Sample 25 0.82 0.47 1.00
method ( b C2)
Klein-Spady: Sample 14 2.07 1.25 3.40
conditional mean Sample 25 3.59 2.31 3.41
method ( b C1)
Klein-Spady: Sample 14 0.50 0.25 0.70
conditional median Sample 25 1.73 0.98 2.05
method ( b C2)
4n = 1588; 5n = 1646;
26Figure 3 Kernel estimates of the distributions of stigma/claim costs
for IS recipients (sample 2, cleaned data)
How do these estimates compare with others in the literature? There
are no directly comparable ﬁgures available, since other researchers have not
taken account of the conditioning on observed take-up which is appropriate.
For example, Blundell et. al. (1988 p.72) estimated claim costs by ﬁnding the
level of entitlement at which the take-up probability is 0.5. This approach
ignores the self selection problem which is overcome by expressions (14) and
(15). Duclos (1995 p. 409) ﬁnds some illustrative expected costs of claiming
Supplementary Beneﬁts (SB) in Britain using the 1985 FES for beneﬁtu n i t s
with digerent characteristics. Among the cases depicted for pensioners, take-
up costs range from over $3 per week for single pensioners to over $20 for
couples. These expected costs are however not conditional on the take-up
event. It is possible to estimate the scale of claim costs using published
estimates of take-up models. The analysis closest to our own is the work on
Housing Beneﬁt( H B )b yB l u n d e l let. al., using Family Expenditure Survey
data for 1984. From the published probit coecients and sample means
relating to retired/unoccupied respondents (Blundell et. al., 1988, pages 73-
2774), we can apply the predictors (11) and (14) to estimate implicit claim
costs for the average 1984 pensioner claimant. Respectively, these come to
$1.70 and $1.02 (updated to 1998 prices) using the conditional mean and
median methods. These are comparable with our 1997-2000 estimates for IS.
5.2.2 Claim costs faced by non-claimants
The claim costs faced by those who do not participate in the IS programme
are impossible to estimate reliably. For participants, claim costs are bounded
by the amount of entitlement B but for non-participants, they are unbounded.
The conditional mean method in particular is numerically unstable because
it is heavily inﬂuenced by the tail behaviour of the function F(.), which is
not well-determined statistically. To get good estimates of the upper tail
of the claim costs distribution, we would need to observe some cases with
very large amounts of entitlement but this is prevented by the design of the
beneﬁts y s t e m .
Table 5 shows the median of the estimated costs of claiming for IS non-
participants. The estimates of claim costs are found to be of a smaller mag-
nitude with the Klein-Spady model as opposed to the probit model, when
the cleaned data is used and also in sample 2. These median claim costs
are much larger than those found for IS recipients. Figure 4 compares the
distributions of estimated claim costs of IS non-participants for the probit
and Klein-Spady models. Among non-participants, the estimates suggest a
highly skewed distribution, with a long upper tail. This is especially true for
the probit model, which lacks the ﬂexibility of the semi-parametric approach,
and for the pre-cleaned data.
Table 5 Median of estimated stigma/claim costs
for Income Support non-recipients ($ per week)
Pre-cleaning Cleaned
Probit: b C2 Sample 11 746.73 799.03
Sample 22 111.25 71.83
Klein-Spady: b C2 Sample 11 107.06 102.34
Sample 22 72.14 55.09
1n=1036 (pre-cleaned) 1036(cleaned); 2n=829 (pre-cleaned) 829(cleaned);
28Figure 4 Kernel estimates of the distributions of stigma/claim costs
for IS non-recipients (sample 2, cleaned data)
6 Implications for poverty measurement
How much digerence does allowance for claim costs make to the empirical
measurement of pensioner poverty? To answer this satisfactorily we need to
make use of the whole distribution of claim costs, rather than its mean or
m e d i a n .W eh a v eap o v e r t yl i n eT(X)w h i c hm a yd e p e n do nt h ed e m o g r a p h i c
characteristics of the beneﬁt unit. Ignoring implicit claim costs, we count a
pensioner unit as being in poverty if their total net income Y +B falls below
the threshold where B is now deﬁned as actual IS receipt. Deﬁne S to be
the number of individuals in the beneﬁtu n i t .W eu s et h ep o v e r t ym e a s u r eo f
Foster et. al. (1984), denoted here FGT. This measure weights individuals
in poverty according to their distance below the poverty threshold. We set
the poverty-aversion parameter to 2, so that the deﬁnition is:
FGT =
E [SQ(Y,B,X)]
E (S)
(18)
29where:
Q(Y,B,X)=
;
A A ?
A A =
³
1  Y +B
T(X)
´2
if Y + B  T(X)
0 otherwise
(19)
A baseline estimate of this measure can be computed by replacing the ex-
pectations in (18) with sample averages:
[ FGT =
n X
i=1
SiQ(Yi,B i,Xi)/
n X
i=1
Si (20)
This measure can be adjusted for claim costs by using the estimated costs
directly. In this case, the function Q(Y,B,X)i n( 2 0 )i ss u b s t i t u t e db y
Q
W(Y,B, b C,X)=
;
A A A A A A ?
A A A A A A =
³
T(X)3Y
T(X)
´2 if Y  T(X)
and B =0
µ
T(X)3Y 3B+b C
T(X)
¶2 if Y + B  b C  T(X)
and B>0
0o t h e r w i s e
(21)
Alternatively, we can use an analytical adjustment for claim costs. In gen-
eral this is preferable since it gives a consistent and more ecient esti-
mate. For those receiving beneﬁt, log claim costs are given by lnC =
Z + V and are conditional on the event Z + V< lnB.T h u s w e c a n
estimate the expectation in the numerator of (18) as the sample average of
SiE [Q(Yi,B i,Xi)|Bi,Xi]=SiQWW
i where QWW
i is constructed as follows:
Q
WW =
;
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A ?
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A =
³
T(X)3Y
T(X)
´2 if Y  T(X)
and B =0
ln B R
3"
(
T(X)3Y 3B+C
T(X) )
2
dF(
ln C3Z
j )
F(
ln(B)3Z
j )
if Y + B  T(X)
and B>0
ln B R
ln(Y +B3T(X))
(
T(X)3Y 3B+C
T(X) )
2
f(
ln C3Z
j )dlnC
F(
ln(B)3Z
j )
if Y + B>T(X),
and Y< T (X)
0 otherwise
(22)
30where Y is the net income of the beneﬁt unit excluding beneﬁts and the
poverty line, T(X), is a percentage of the IS guaranteed minimum for the
beneﬁtu n i tM.
The results are given in Tables 6 and 7. The egects of adjusting for
claim costs are small. Depending on the sample, threshold and estimator
used, measured poverty is some 4-16% higher when claim costs are taken
into account. This is not negligible, but hardly a dramatic impact.
Table 6 Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty measures (probit model).
Poverty line
1.2 M 1.1 MM0.9 M
Pre-cleaning [ FGT 1.64 0.93 0.53 0.34
n =1 1 ,524 [ FGT
W
(mean) 1.70 0.97 0.53 0.34
[ FGT
W
(median) 1.64 0.93 0.53 0.34
Sample [ FGT
WW
1.72 0.99 0.56 0.36
1 Cleaned [ FGT 1.42 0.76 0.40 0.25
n =1 0 ,268 [ FGT
W
(mean) 1.47 0.79 0.41 0.25
[ FGT
W
(median) 1.42 0.77 0.40 0.25
[ FGT
WW
1.48 0.81 0.43 0.26
Pre-cleaning [ FGT 1.73 1.03 0.61 0.39
n =1 1 ,477 [ FGT
W
(mean) 1.84 1.10 0.63 0.40
[ FGT
W
(median) 1.75 1.04 0.61 0.39
Sample [ FGT
WW
1.87 1.14 0.67 0.43
2 Cleaned [ FGT 1.46 0.82 0.45 0.28
n =1 0 ,236 [ FGT
W
(mean) 1.56 0.89 0.47 0.29
[ FGT
W
(median) 1.48 0.83 0.46 0.28
[ FGT
WW
1.59 0.92 0.51 0.31
31Table 7 Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty measures (Klein-Spady model).
Poverty line
1.2 M 1.1 MM 0.9 M
Pre-cleaning [ FGT 1.64 0.93 0.53 0.34
n =1 1 ,524 [ FGT
W
(mean) 1.81 1.05 0.57 0.35
[ FGT
W
(median) 1.75 1.01 0.55 0.35
Sample [ FGT
WW
1.83 1.07 0.60 0.37
1 Cleaned [ FGT 1.42 0.76 0.40 0.25
n =1 0 ,268 [ FGT
W
(mean) 1.50 0.81 0.41 0.25
[ FGT
W
(median) 1.44 0.78 0.40 0.25
[ FGT
WW
1.50 0.83 0.44 0.26
Pre-cleaning [ FGT 1.73 1.03 0.61 0.39
n =1 1 ,477 [ FGT
W
(mean) 1.89 1.14 0.65 0.41
[ FGT
W
(median) 1.81 1.08 0.63 0.40
[ FGT
WW
1.92 1.18 0.69 0.43
Sample Cleaned [ FGT 1.46 0.82 0.45 0.28
2 n =1 0 ,236 [ FGT
W
(mean) 1.59 0.90 0.48 0.29
[ FGT
W
(median) 1.52 0.85 0.46 0.29
[ FGT
WW
1.62 0.94 0.52 0.32
7 Conclusions
This paper studies the take-up of Income Support by UK pensioners using
data on the ﬁnancial years 1997/8-1999/2000 from the British Family Re-
sources Survey. Two binary choice models of IS take-up are estimated: a
probit model and a more ﬂexible semiparametric model. In addition to the
(log) level of entitlement, the main factors contributing to high claim costs
are income per head, education, status as a recipient of disability beneﬁt,
owner-occupation and location. Using a revealed preference approach we
consider the implicit costs of claiming Income Support. These costs might
32arise from the onerous nature of the claims process, from social stigma as-
sociated with being on welfare and from the diculty of acquiring informa-
tion about the beneﬁt system. We develop a new technique of constructing
individual-speciﬁc estimates of claim costs, allowing for the self-selection ef-
fect of the take-up process. Implicit costs are found to be small for most IS
recipients, typically around $2-4 per week for the average beneﬁt recipient,
and consequently the degree of measured poverty among pensioners increases
by only a modest amount (up to 16% for the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke index)
when these claim costs are taken into account.
The revealed preference approach argues that non-participants judge them-
selves to be better og foregoing than claiming their entitlements because
of these costs. It does not follow from our results, however, that non-
participation is no cause for concern. The fact that some eligible individuals
choose not to participate in means-tested programmes simply indicates that
they ﬁnd living below the poverty line preferable to living on welfare. If gov-
ernments want to use means-tested welfare programmes to prevent poverty,
they need to ﬁnd ways to reduce the size of the costs involved relative to the
size of the beneﬁts paid out.
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35Table A1 Weekly rates of principal social security beneﬁts
applicable to pensioners in the 1997-8, 1998-9 and 1999/0 FRS
$ per week
1997/8 1998/9 1999/0
Basic state pension Full rate 62.45 64.70 66.75
‘Married woman’s’ rate 37.35 38.70 39.35
Age 80+ addition to
state pension 0.25 0.25 0.25
Attendance Allowance Higher rate 49.50 51.30 52.95
Lower rate 33.10 34.30 35.40
Disability Living Highest rate 49.50 51.30 52.95
Allowance Middle rate 33.10 34.30 35.40
(care component) Lowest rate 13.15 13.60 14.05
Disability Living Higher rate 34.60 35.85 37.00
Allowance Lower rate 13.15 13.60 14.05
(mobility component)
Income Support for single pensioner under 75 68.80 70.45 75.00
pensioners single pensioner 75-79 71.00 72.65 77.30
single pensioner 80+ 75.70 77.55 82.25
single pensioner with SDP 112.85 116.05 122.00
couple, both under 75 106.80 109.35 116.60
couple, one or both 75-79 109.90 112.55 119.85
couple, one or both 80+ 115.15 117.90 125.30
couple, one or both 75-79,
one with CP 123.25 126.20 133.80
couple, one or both 80+,
with CP 128.50 131.55 139.25
couple, both with SDP 189.45 194.90 204.80
upper capital threshold 8000 8000 8000
lower capital threshold 3000 3000 3000
N o t e s : I ti sn o tp o s s i b l et or e c e i v eb o t hA t t e n d a n c eA l l o w a n c ea n dt h ec a r ec o m p o n e n t
of Disability Living Allowance. Disability Allowance (care and mobility component) is
payable to people aged 65+ only if they started to receive it before reaching 65.
1 CP = Carer Premium; 2 SDP = Severe Disability Premium
36Table A2 Variable deﬁnitions
Variable Deﬁnition
ln(Bi) Log of IS entitlement as calculated in
Sample i ($ per week)
Single male Dummy variable = 1 for single-man
household household, 0 otherwise
Single female Dummy variable = 1 for single-woman
household household, 0 otherwise
Age Age of the head of the household
Income = Net income ($ per week) excluding
per head IS per person in the household
Head Dummy variable = 1 if household
educated head left school aged 15 or more,
past 14 0 otherwise
Disability Dummy variable=1 if any person in the
beneﬁt household receives AA , DLA self care
and/or Mobility component of DLA
Registered Dummy variable = 1 if any person
Disabled in the household is registered as
disabled with the LA
Owner Dummy variable = 1 if the household
occupier owns the house
Rent free Dummy variable = 1 if the household is
non-owner-occupier and lives rent-free
Wales/ Dummy variable = 1 if the household
Scotland lives in Wales/Scotland
37Appendix: Additional tables
The following tables are included to assist referees. They are not intended
for publication
38Table A3 Sample means of explanatory variables
and probit coecients (pre-cleaning data; standard
errors in parentheses)
Sample Probit Sample Probit
Variable mean coe1 mean coe2
ln(B1) 2.550 0.151
(0.023) (0.030)
ln(B2) 2.545 0.261
(0.022) (0.027)
ln(B3)
Single male 0.143 0.255 0.142 -0.018
household (0.006) (0.110) (0.006) (0.104)
Single female 0.760 0.498 0.754 0.224
household (0.008) (0.093) (0.008) (0.086)
Age/10 7.907 -2.493 7.899 -2.622
(0.013) (0.739) (0.013) (0.727)
(Age/10)2 63.009 0.148 62.881 0.153
(0.205) (0.046) (0.202) (0.046)
Income 65.464 -0.017 66.705 -0.008
per head (0.331) (0.002) (0.340) (0.002)
Head educated 0.200 -0.280 0.196 -0.307
past 14 (0.007) (0.064) (0.007) (0.063)
Disability 0.380 -0.185 0.378 -0.401
beneﬁt (0.009) (0.079) (0.009) (0.070)
Registered 0.193 0.177 0.192 0.166
Disabled (0.007) (0.071) (0.007) (0.070)
Owner 0.276 -0.549 0.278 -0.554
occupier (0.008) (0.056) (0.008) (0.055)
Rent free 0.035 -0.393 0.034 -0.374
(0.003) (0.132) (0.003) (0.130)
Wales/ 0.178 -0.132 0.179 -0.146
Scotland (0.007) (0.065) (0.007) (0.064)
n 2929 3019
1Intercept = 11.429 (std err = 2.929);
2Intercept = 11.633 (std err = 2.883)
39Table A4 Sample means of explanatory variables
and probit coecients (cleaned data; standard errors
in parentheses)
Sample Probit Sample Probit
Variable mean coe1 mean coe2
ln(B1) 2.403 0.138
(0.025) (0.032)
ln(B2) 2.442 0.296
(0.024) (0.030)
ln(B3)
Single male 0.142 0.123 0.142 -0.148
household (0.007) (0.119) (0.007) (0.112)
Single female 0.755 0.495 0.748 0.198
household (0.009) (0.101) (0.009) (0.094)
Age/10 7.876 -1.919 7.871 -2.338
(0.014) (0.838) (0.014) (0.833)
(Age/10)2 62.511 0.112 62.439 0.134
(0.223) (0.053) (0.220) (0.053)
Income 66.802 -0.014 68.097 -0.004
per head (0.394) (0.002) (0.407) (0.002)
Head educated 0.203 -0.305 0.199 -0.322
past 14 (0.008) (0.070) (0.008) (0.069)
Disability 0.345 -0.061 0.346 -0.381
beneﬁt (0.010) (0.092) (0.010) (0.083)
Registered 0.175 0.213 0.175 0.176
Disabled (0.008) (0.082) (0.008) (0.081)
Owner 0.268 -0.546 0.270 -0.562
occupier (0.009) (0.062) (0.009) (0.061)
Rent free 0.034 -0.378 0.034 -0.369
(0.004) (0.147) (0.004) (0.147)
Wales/ 0.173 -0.157 0.173 -0.188
Scotland (0.008) (0.073) (0.008) (0.073)
n 2417 2475
1Intercept = 9.041 (std err = 3.305);
2Intercept = 10.321 (std err = 3.289)
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